Abstract. The main theorems of this paper are (1) there is no least transitive model of KelleyMorse set theory KM and (2) there is a least β-model-that is, a transitive model which is correct about which of its classes are well-founded-of Gödel-Bernays set theory GBC + Elementary Transfinite Recursion. Along the way I characterize when a countable model of ZFC has a least GBC-realization and show that no countable model of ZFC has a least KM-realization. I also show that fragments of Elementary Transfinite Recursion have least β-models and, for sufficiently weak fragments, least transitive models. These fragments can be separated from each other and from the full principle of Elementary Transfinite Recursion by consistency strength. The main question left unanswered by this article is whether there is a least transitive model of GBC + Elementary Transfinite Recursion.
Introduction
The jumping-off point for this article is the following well-known theorem asserting that there is a certain kind of least model of ZFC.
Theorem (Shepherdson [She53] , Cohen [Coh63] ). If there is a transitive model of ZFC then there is a least transitive model of ZFC. That is, there is a transitive model M of ZFC so that if N is any transitive model of ZFC then M ⊆ N .
From a modern perspective, this result is not difficult to prove. This minimal model is L α where α is the least height of a transitive model of ZFC. The absoluteness of L gives that L α is contained in every transitive model of ZFC.
This proof can be generalized to get analogous results for many strengthenings of ZFC. If T is an extension of ZFC which has a transitive model and is absolute to L, meaning that M |= T implies L M |= T , then T has a least transitive model. This gives least transitive models of ZFC plus small large cardinals. There is, for instance, a least transitive model of ZFC + there is a Mahlo cardinal. It is not difficult to see, however, that this cannot be extended too far up the large cardinal hierarchy.
Theorem. There is no least transitive model of any T extending ZFC which proves there is a measurable cardinal.
Proof. Suppose otherwise that N were such a model. Let j : N → M be the elementary embedding from the measurable cardinal. By elementarity, M believes there is a measurable cardinal. Therefore by the leastness of N we have M ⊇ N , violating that the measure giving the embedding is not in M .
In contrast, results from inner model theory show that if there is a transitive model which thinks the ordinal κ is measurable, then there is a least such model. This extends to strong cardinals, Woodin cardinals, etc.
A second direction the Shepherdson-Cohen result could be generalized is from first-order set theory to second-order set theory. Given some second-order set theory, does it have a least transitive model? A natural first theory to look at here is GBC, Gödel-Bernays set theory with global choice. Implicit in Shepherdson's argument is the answer to this question: there is a least transitive model of GBC.
The main result of this article is that this does not happen with Kelley-Morse set theory, the second natural theory to consider.
Main Theorem 1. There is no least transitive model of KM.
The third theory I consider is ETR, intermediate in strength between GBC and KM. This theory is axiomatized by the axioms of GBC plus the Elementary Transfinite Recursion schema. While this article does not answer the question of whether there is a least transitive model of ETR, I do answer the question for β-models of ETR. A transitive model of second-order set theory is a β-model if it is correct about well-foundedness for class relations. This gives a more restricted class of models.
Main Theorem 2.
There is a least β-model of ETR, if there is any β-model of ETR. In the literature the standard terminology is to refer to minimal models rather than, as I do, least models-for instance, Cohen's article [Coh63] is titled "A minimal model for set theory". This terminology is perhaps a misnomer; these models are not only minimal in the order-theoretic sense-they have no smaller submodels-but are also least-they are contained in every model. I depart from the standard language because this article considers both least models and minimal-in the order-theoretic sense-models and I wish for my word choice to differentiate between the two phenomena.
The structure of this article is as follows. I first discuss some preliminary definitions and results. This is followed by a section recalling some facts from admissible set theory, which will be used to prove the results about KM. The remaining three sections are each devoted to one of the major second-order set theories under consideration. These three sections are largely independent. Section 4 is about GBC. I characterize when a countable model of ZFC has a least GBC-realization and show that any countable model of GBC has minimal extensions. Section 5 is about ETR and some weak variants of ETR. I prove main theorem 2 and show that there are least transitive models of certain fragments of ETR. The section ends by separating these fragments of ETR. Section 6 is about KM. I prove main theorem 1 and get as a corollary that no countable model of ZFC has a least KM-realization. Finally, I conclude with a brief discussion of some related theorems about least models of KM that have appeared in the literature.
Preliminaries
The second-order set theories considered in this article are formulated so that their models consist of two parts, the sets of or first-order part of the model and the classes of or second-order part of the model. All second-order set theories considered in this paper will include an axiom asserting extensionality holds for classes. This ensures that any model of these theories is isomorphic to one whose second-order part consists of subsets of the first-order part. Without loss we will consider only such models. Formally, models of second-order set theories are of the form (M, X , ∈ 1 , ∈ 2 ) where M is the first-order part, X is the second-order part, ∈ 1 is the set-set membership relation for the model, and ∈ 2 is the set-class membership relation for the model. For simplicity, I will write (M, X ), suppressing writing the membership relations. I will use ∈ M , or simply ∈ if it is unambiguous, to refer to both the set-set and the set-class membership relations of M .
A model (M, X ) of second-order set theory is transitive if both its set-set and set-class membership relations are the true ∈. For the theories considered in this article, this is equivalent to asking for M to be transitive or asking for X to be transitive.
Definition 3. Given a second-order set theory T , the least transitive model of T , provided it exists, is a transitive model (M, X ) of T so that if (N, Y) is any transitive model of T then M ⊆ N and X ⊆ Y. For the theories we consider, this is equivalent to requiring that X ⊆ Y.
If M is a first-order model of set theory and T is a second-order set theory, say that X ⊆ P(M ) is a T -realization for M if (M, X ) |= T . If there is some T -realization for M then we say that M is T -realizable. The least T -realization for M , provided it exists, is X ⊆ P(M ) so that (M, X ) |= T and for any
That is, X is a least T -realization for M if it is the least element in the poset consisting of all T -realizations for M ordered by the subset relation.
A transitive model (M, X ) of second-order set theory is a β-model if it is correct about wellfoundedness for class relations. That is, if R ∈ X and (M, X ) |= "R is well-founded" then R really is well-founded. Not every transitive model is a β-model, even if we restrict to models satisfying a strong second-order set theory; see corollary 43. This is in contrast to the well-known fact that well-foundedness is absolute for transitive models of ZFC. For models of ZFC, there are two characterizations of well-foundedness: a Π 1 characterization, namely that every nonempty subset of dom R has an R-minimal element; and a Σ 1 characterization, namely there is a ranking function from R to Ord.
In the second-order context, we still have access to the Π 0 1 characterization. 1 To say that a class relation R is well-founded is to say that there is no descending ω-sequence in R. But such an object must be a set, as its members must be bounded in rank.
As such, well-foundedness is downward absolute to transitive models of second-order set theory; if R ∈ X is well-founded in V then (M, X ) thinks R is well-founded. However, well-foundedness for class relations is not upward absolute for transitive models of second-order set theory. The trouble is that class relations can have rank > Ord so we cannot use the ∆ 0 0 definition of the von Neumann ordinals to get a Σ 0 1 characterization for well-foundedness.(Of course, well-foundedness for set relations is upward absolute for transitive models.)
Similar to the definitions of the least transitive model of T , a T -realization for M , a T -realizable model, and the least T -realization for M we can define the least β-model of T , a β-T -realization for M , a β-T -realizable model, and the least β-T -realization for M . For instance,
To clarify, the superscript 0 and 1 refer to whether a formula includes quantification over classes, rather than the arithmetical/analytical hierarchies from descriptive set theory. The 0 is for first-order quantification; for instance, a Π 0 1 formula has a single unbounded universal set quantifier, with all other quantifiers bounded. The 1 is for second-order quantification; for instance, a Σ 1 1 formula is of the form ∃Xϕ(X, P ) where ϕ is Π 0 k for some k.
The convention in this paper when talking about formulae in the language of set theory is to use capital letters for classes and class variables and lowercase letters for sets and set variables. For example, the formula ∀X∃y y ∈ X gives the (false) proposition that every class has some set as a member.
Definition 4. Kelley-Morse set theory KM is the second-order set theory consisting of the following axioms:
• ZFC for the first-order part;
• Extensionality for classes;
• Class Replacement, asserting that the image of any set under a class function is a set;
• Global Choice, asserting that there is a bijection between V and Ord; and • The Class Comprehension axiom schema, namely the axioms ∀P ∃A∀x x ∈ A ⇔ ϕ(x,P ), for every second-order formula ϕ(x,P ). That is, ϕ can include quantifier over sets or over classes.
Gödel-Bernays set theory GBC is axiomatized similarly, except that the Class Comprehension schema is weakened. Its axioms are ZFC for the first-order part, Extensionality for classes, Class Replacement, Global Choice, and what I will call the First-Order Comprehension schema. This is a subschema of the Class Comprehension schema where we restrict to only formulae which do not include class quantifiers.
Intermediate between GBC and KM is the theory ETR. The axioms of ETR consist of the axioms of GBC plus the Elementary Transfinite Recursion schema.
2 This schema asserts that if ϕ is a firstorder formula (possibly with class parameters) and R is a well-founded class relation then there is a solution to the recursion of ϕ along R. Formally, let ϕ(x, Y, A) be a first-order formula, possibly with a class parameter A and let R be a well-founded class relation. Denote by < R the transitive closure of R. The instance of ETR for ϕ and R asserts that there is a class S ⊆ dom R × V which satisfies S r = {x : ϕ(x, S ↾ r, A)} for all r ∈ dom R. Here, S r = {x : (r, x) ∈ S} denotes the r-th slice of S and
is the partial solution below r. One well-known class recursion is the Tarskian definition of truth. This recursion takes place over a (proper) class tree of height ω. Thus, ETR asserts the existence of a first-order truth predicate and hence proves Con(ZFC), as restricting the truth predicate to parameter-free formulae gives a consistent completion of ZFC.
3 This shows that ETR exceeds GBC in consistency strength. For an upper bound, one can use Π 1 1 -CA to show that there is no least failure of a potential solution to an elementary recursion and from that conclude that a solution must exist. Therefore, ETR is properly contained within Π Theorem 5. Over GBC, Elementary Transfinite Recursion is equivalent to the assertion that for every class A and every class well-order Γ there is a Γ-iterated first-order truth predicate relative to A.
A Γ-iterated truth predicate is a class T of triples (a, ϕ, p) where (a, ϕ, p) ∈ T intuitively means that ϕ(p) is true at level a ∈ dom(Γ). Here, ϕ is in the language with ∈ and a predicate symbolT for T . Formally, this is defined by a modified form of the Tarskian recursion, with an extra clause in the definition asserting that (a, T (b, ϕ, p) , q) ∈ T if and only if b < Γ a and (b, ϕ, p) ∈ T . A truth predicate relative to A is for the language expanded with a predicate symbolÂ for A, with an extra clause in the definition asserting that (a, Â (x) , p) ∈ T if and only if p ∈ A.
It can be proven from ETR that any two would-be Γ-iterated truth predicates relative to A must be the same class: they must agree on the truth of atomic assertions, by the definition of an iterated truth predicate, and inductively must agree on the truth of more complicated assertions. I will use Tr Γ (A) to refer to the unique Γ-iterated truth predicate relative to A. Iterated truth predicates not relative to any class will be denoted Tr Γ . As a special case, Tr(A) = Tr 1 (A) is the ordinary truth predicate relative to A.
I include a brief proof sketch for theorem 5 below. For a full proof see the above cited literature. As an immediate corollary we get the following.
Corollary 6. If ω ω ≤ Γ then GBC plus the principle of Elementary Transfinite Recursion for relations of rank ≤ Γ is equivalent over GBC to the existence of Γ-iterated truth predicates relative to any class.
Proof. The assumption on Γ implies that ω ·Γ < Γ+Γ. Because ETR Γ implies ETR Γ+Γ (and ETR Γ·n for all standard n), this gives that we can do the necessary recursions of rank ω · Γ.
For a class well-order Γ, let ETR Γ denote the principle of Elementary Transfinite Recursion restricted to relations of rank ≤ Γ. It must be clarified what this means. If Γ ∈ X then it makes sense to ask whether (M, X ) satisfies ETR Γ -simply use Γ as a parameter. However, this approach flounders upon the questions of whether there is a least β-model of or a least transitive model of ETR Γ . How should Γ be interpreted if we do not already have a model in mind?
For a more robust notion, let Γ be a name for a well-order. That is, Γ is defined by some formula which GBC proves defines a well-order. I will slightly abuse notation and use ETR Γ in this context as well. It denotes GBC plus the principle of Elementary Transfinite Recursion restricted to relations of rank ≤ Γ, where Γ is a name for a well-order. It then makes sense to ask, for instance, whether there is a least transitive model of ETR Γ . One particular natural instance of this is ETR Ord , asserting that recursions of rank ≤ Ord have solutions.
GBC
GBC + there is a truth predicate
KM
Some second-order set theories from GBC to KM, separated by consistency strength.
2.1. Models of second-order set theories. In the interest of having a self-contained presentation, I will summarize some well-known facts about how we construct models of these second-order set theories.
, where ZFC(A) is the expansion of ZFC obtained by allowing a predicate symbol for A in the axiom schemata of ZFC. If A is strongly amenable then A is amenable, meaning that for A ∩ x is a set in M for any x ∈ M . (Formally, there is y ∈ M so that M |= z ∈ y if and only if (M, A) |= z ∈ x and z ∈ A.) Observe that every class in a model of GBC is strongly amenable to the first-order part.
The following folklore observation is key in constructing models of GBC.
Observation 7. Let M be a model of ZFC and let G be a strongly amenable global well-order of M . Then Def(M, G) is a GBC-realization for M , where Def(M, G) is the collection of classes of M first-order definable from G and set parameters.
If M has a definable (from parameters) global well-order then Def(M ) = Def(M, ∅) is a GBCrealization for M . Note that having a definable global well-order is equivalent to satisfying the axiom ∃x V = HOD({x}), where HOD({x}) denotes the (definable) class of all sets hereditarily definable from ordinal parameters and x. (Having a global well-order definable without parameters is equivalent to V = HOD.) Therefore, any model of of ZFC + ∃x V = HOD(x) is GBC-realizable.
Any countable model of ZFC has a GBC-realization, even if it does not have a definable global well-order. This can be seen by a class forcing argument. If C is a Cohen-generic subclass of Ord, then by density C codes a strongly amenable global well-order. If M |= ZFC is countable we can find such C ∈ V as we only need to meet countably many dense definable classes of M . This gives us (M, Def(M, C)) |= GBC in V . As a consequence, GBC is conservative over ZFC. That is, any first-order theorem of GBC is a theorem of ZFC.
This construction does not generalize to uncountable models of ZFC. Say that a model of set theory is rather classless if its only amenable classes are its classes definable from set parameters. Note that the height of a rather classless model must have uncountable cofinality. Any ω-sequence cofinal in the ordinals of a model will be amenable because its initial segments are finite. It cannot, however, be definable for danger of contradicting Replacement. Theorem 9 (Keisler [Kei74] , Shelah [She78] ). Any countable model of ZFC has an elementary top extension to a rather classless model.
5
If we start with countable M |= ZFC with no definable global well-order, then any rather classless N which is an elementary top extension of M has no amenable global well-order and therefore has no GBC-realization.
For ETR and KM, we cannot hope for techniques as general as in the GBC case. A significant obstacle is that there are countable models of ZFC without a KM-realization. This is a consequence of the fact that ETR, and thus also KM, proves Con(ZFC). Consequently, a model of ZFC can fail to have an ETR-realization simply by having the wrong theory; no model of ZFC + ¬ Con(ZFC) can be ETR-realizable. We can also separate ETR and KM in a similar way; if (M, X ) |= ETR+¬ Con(ETR) then M cannot be KM-realizable.
A natural question is to characterize which (countable) models of ZFC are KM-realizable. (Or which models are ETR-realizable.) It is obviously necessary that the model satisfy the first-order consequences of KM. But this is in fact insufficient. Indeed, there is no theory whose models are all KM-realizable.
Theorem 10 (Folklore). There is no first-order theory all of whose models (or even just whose countable models) are KM-realizable. That is, given any consistent T extending ZFC there is a countable model of T which has no KM-realization.
The theorem also holds if KM is replaced by ETR or any other second-order set theory which proves the existence of a first-order truth predicate.
Proof. Suppose that M is a model of T and X is a KM-realization for M . (If no model of T has a KM-realization we are already done.) We can assume without loss that M and X are countable.
Let S ∈ X be the truth predicate for M . By reflection, there is a club of ordinals α ∈ Ord M so that (V This model N is the desired counterexample. We have N |= T yet N cannot be KM-realizable, as it is not the union of an elementary tower from its V α s.
The simplest way to produce a model of KM comes from looking at inaccessible cardinals: if κ is inaccessible, then (V κ , V κ+1 ) |= KM. Of course, once we have any transitive model of KM we get countable transitive models by Löwenheim-Skolem.
Indeed, (V κ , V κ+1 ) satisfies more than just KM. It can easily be checked that it satisfies the following theory KM + .
Definition 11. Let KM + denote the theory consisting of the axioms of KM plus the Class Collection axiom schema. This schema asserts that if for every set there is a class satisfying some property, then there is a single class coding the "meta-class" consisting of a witnessing class for every set. Formally, instances of this schema take the form ) along with the assertion that there is a largest cardinal κ and that κ is inaccessible. To be clear since in this context not all sets have powersets, the assertion that κ is inaccessible is: κ is regular and 2 λ exists with 2 λ < κ for all λ < κ. In particular, in a model of ZFC − I the only sets without a powerset are those of size κ. Marek and Mostowski [MM75] showed that KM + and ZFC
For the other direction, looking at the definable meta-class of well-founded, extensional classes of a model of KM + and modding out by isomorphism gives a model of ZFC − I . This bi-interpretability result is useful when working with models of KM + , as it allows one to instead work with models of a first-order set theory, allowing additional tools.
Given (M, X ) |= KM + I will call the model of ZFC − I obtained by (M, X ) in this manner the unrolling of (M, X ). The intuition is that the well-founded extensional classes in X are copies of the sets in the ZFC − I model which have been rolled-up to lower their rank as much as possible. When looking at the phenomenon of least models moving from KM to KM + is harmless.
This Y is obtained by X by a second-order analogue of Gödel's construction of L within V .
A detour through admissible set theory
In order to obtain main theorem 1 I will make use of some concepts from the theory of admissible structures. Recall that Kripke-Platek set theory KP is the (first-order) set theory consisting of the axioms of Extensionality, Pairing, Union, and Foundation, along with the Separation and Collection schemata for Σ 0 formulae. Transitive models of KP are known as admissible sets. To each admissible set A can be associated the infinitary logic L A . The formulae in L A can be given by the following schema:
• All atomic formulae are in L A ;
• If ϕ is in L A then so is ¬ϕ;
• If Φ ∈ A is a set of formulae in L A then ϕ∈Φ ϕ and ϕ∈Φ ϕ are in L A ; and
• If ϕ is in L A then so are ∃xϕ and ∀xϕ.
Note that L A ⊆ A. Satisfaction for L A theories is defined by the usual Tarskian recursion, extended transfinitely.
The following theorem, due to H. Friedman [Fri73] , can be used to produce models N of set theory which are "ill-founded at an admissible set A", meaning that N is an end-extension of A and there is a descending ω-sequence coinitial in Ord N \ Ord A . Such models will have that wfp(N ), the well-founded part of N , has the same height as and contains A. But in general it is not possible to insist that wfp(N ) is exactly A. For example, suppose we want a model N of ZFC + 0 ♯ exists which is ill-founded at L ω CK 1 , the least admissible set which has ω as an element. Because 0 ♯ is a subset of ω, it must be in wfp(
. Let A be a countable admissible set and let T ⊆ A be an L A theory which is Σ 1 -definable in A and extends KP. If there is a model of T which contains A then there is an ill-founded model N of T so that • N is an end extension of A;
• wfp(N ) ⊇ A; and
The following picture illustrates the theorem. The dashed line represents that N is ill-founded at A.
A N I will use a strengthening of this theorem which applies to ill-founded models of KP as well as transitive models. The difficulty is that the elementary tools of admissible set theory only apply directly to transitive models of KP. To overcome this, Barwise introduced the notion of the admissible cover.
7 The admissible cover of a (possibly ill-founded) model A of set theory is an admissible structure with A as its urelements. We can work with this admissible structure to prove results about A.
Recall that KPU is KP formulated with urelements. I will write M = (M ; U ; R 1 , . . .) for the transitive model of KPU with sets M , urelements U , and additional relations, functions, or constants R 1 , . . .. Let (A, E) be a possibly ill-founded model of KP. Say that such an admissible structure M = (M ; A; E, F ) covers A if this additional function F maps urelements to their set of E-predecessors. That is, if p ∈ A then F (p) = {q ∈ A : q E p} ∈ M . (This function allows us to translate bounded quantification in the language of A to bounded quantification in the language of M . Quantifiers of the form ∀p E q can be replaced with ∀p ∈ F (q).)
There is a smallest admissible structure which covers A, known as the admissible cover of A and denoted Cov A . This structure enjoys many nice properties. Proposition 14. Let (A, E) |= KP and C = Cov A .
• C is countable if A is countable.
• The pure sets of C are isomorphic to the well-founded part of A.
• For any a ⊆ A, we have a ∈ C if and only if there is x ∈ A so that a = {y ∈ A : A |= Y E x}.
As a consequence, if x ∈ A then there is an L C sentence defining x.
• The infinitary diagram of A, considered as a set of L C -sentences, is Σ 1 -definable in C.
We are now in a position to generalize Friedman's theorem to the ill-founded case. We want, when starting with a possibly ill-founded model A to produce the same picture as above. That is, given a theory T satisfying an appropriate consistency assumption, we want N ⊇ A a model of T which is ill-founded at A.
A ) |= KP be countable and C = Cov A . Suppose that T is an L C theory which is Σ 1 -definable over C and extends KP. If there is a model of T which contains A then there is (N, E N ) |= T so that:
Proof Sketch. Friedman's original proof can be modified to give a proof this variant. Extend T , if necessary, to include the infinitary diagram of A. This extension is consistent as there is a model of T containing A. We want to construct a further extension T ′ so that, for countably many new constants c n , the following conditions hold:
(
′ ; and (6) If "a ∈ c n " ∈ T ′ for each a ∈ A then there is m > n so that "c m ∈ c n " ∈ T ′ and "a ∈ c m " ∈ T ′ for each a ∈ A. Conditions (1-3) ensure there is a model of T ′ . Condition (5) forces any model of T ′ to contain new ordinals. Conditions (4-6) force that the model of T ′ is ill-founded above A. To see this note, that if β < γ are ordinals above Ord A but below inf{rank(c n ) : c n above A} then for every c n " rank(c n ) ≥ β ⇒ rank(c n ) > γ" ∈ T ′ so by condition (4) β > γ, a contradiction.
T ′ is constructed in ω many stages. We continually add new formulae to ensure properties (1-6) hold. Fix an enumeration ϕ n of the L C sentences so that c n first appears after ϕ n and before the first appearance of c n+1 .
• Define T ′ 0 = T ∪ {a ∈ c 0 : a ∈ A}. This theory is consistent by Barwise compactness. This ensures property (5). Set m 0 = 1 and m −1 = 0.
•
-Otherwise, the theory T ′ 3n+2 ∪ {a ∈ c mn : a ∈ M } is consistent. By Barwise compactness, so is the the theory T ′ 3n+2 ∪ {a ∈ c mn : a ∈ A} ∪ {c mn ∈ c mn−1 }. Take this to be T ′ 3n+3 and set m n+1 to be the index of the least unused c m .
• Set T ′ = n T ′ n . By the construction for T ′ 3n+3 , for every n ≥ −1 we have that c mn+1 ∈ c mn and a ∈ c mn , for all a ∈ A are in T ′ . This gives property (6).
GBC
Let us begin with a classical result.
Theorem 16 (Shepherdson [She53] ). If there is a transitive model of GBC then there is a least transitive model of GBC.
Proof. Let L α be the least transitive model of ZFC.
Essentially the same argument gives the following.
Corollary 17. If there is a β-model of GBC then there is a least β-model of GBC.
The key to proving this is the following observation.
(⇒) Suppose towards a contradiction that X is the least GBC-realization for M . By leastness and as M has no definable global well-order, it must be that X = Def(M, G), where G is some global well-order of M . Consider the forcing to add a Cohen subclass to Ord with set-sized conditions. Note that this forcing does not add any new sets as it is κ-closed for every κ. Let H be (M, X )-generic for this forcing. That is, H meets every dense class in X . Given any set a, by density a is coded into H. This yields a global well-order definable from H: say that a < H b if the index where a is first coded into H is less than the index where b is first coded into H. Therefore, Def(M, H) is a GBC-realization for M .
I claim that G ∈ Def(M, H). Otherwise, there is a first-order formula ϕ, possibly with set parameters and H as a class parameter but where G does not appear as a parameter, so that (M, Def(M, G, H)) |= ∀x x ∈ G ⇔ ϕ(x, H). There is some p ∈ H forcing this statement; that is, there is p ∈ H so that (M, Def(M, G)) |= "p ∀x x ∈Ǧ ⇔ ϕ(x,Ḣ)". Thus, (M, Def(M, G)) |= "∀x x ∈ G ⇔ p ϕ(x,Ḣ)" so for all x ∈ M , we have x ∈ G if and only if (M, Def(M, G)) |= p ϕ(x,Ḣ). But this formula doesn't depend upon G, so this happens if and only if M |= p ϕ(x,Ḣ). Therefore G ∈ Def(M ), contradicting that M has no definable global well-order.
As G ∈ Def(M, H), it cannot be that X = Def(M, G) ⊆ Def(M, H), contradicting the leastness of X .
As remarked in Section 2, a model of ZFC having a definable global well-order is equivalent to that model satisfying the first-order sentence ∃x V = HOD({x}). Thus, whether a countable model of set theory has a least GBC-realization is recognizable from the theory of the model.
Corollary 20. A countable model of ZFC has a least GBC-realization if and only if it satisfies ∃x V = HOD({x}).
The construction used in the proof of theorem 19 does not show show that any countable M |= ∃x V = HOD({x}) has no minimal GBC-realization. The reason is that the Def(M, G) and Def(M, H) from the proof are incomparable. We have already seen one direction, that Def(M, G) ⊆ Def(M, H). The other direction, that Def(M, H) ⊆ Def(M, G), is because by genericity H ∈ Def(M, G). We get that Def(M, G) is not least, but left open is the possibility that it could be minimal.
Question 21. Is there M |= ZFC + ∀x V = HOD({x}) with a minimal GBC-realization X for M ? Can this happen for countable M ?
Answering this question in general seems difficult, but something can be said for special cases. First is a negative result that minimal GBC-realizations cannot come from Cohen forcing.
Proposition 22. Consider M |= ZFC and suppose C ⊆ Ord M is Cohen-generic. Then, Def(M, C) is not a minimal GBC-realization.
Proof. Define C ′ as α ∈ C ′ if and only if α · 2 + 1 ∈ C. If we think of C as an Ord-length binary sequence, C
′ is what appears on the odd coordinates of C. It is a standard result about Cohen forcing that C ′ is Cohen-generic but C ∈ Def(M, C ′ ). Thus, Def(M, C ′ ) Def(M, C) and so Def(M, C) is not minimal.
If we want a model of ZFC with minimal but not least GBC-realizations, we must start with a model without a definable global well-order. We want to add a strongly amenable global well-order to this model which is minimal in a certain sense. A natural place to look here is at generalizations of Sacks forcing. As is well-known, Sacks reals are minimal over the ground model. Can we generalize Sacks forcing to produce a minimal generic class of ordinals which codes a global well-order?
Generalizing Sacks forcing to add generic classes of ordinals has been considered before. Hamkins, Linetsky, and Reitz [HLR13] consider so-called "perfect generics", an adaptation of a technique of Kossak and Schmerl [KS06] from models of arithmetic. Kossak and Schmerl's technique is in turn an adaptation from Sacks forcing over ω. They produce minimal generics for countable models M of arithmetic, i.e. inductive G ⊆ M so that for A ∈ Def(M, G) either A ∈ Def(M ) or G ∈ Def(M, A).
I do not see a way to use perfect generics to produce minimal but not least GBC-realizations. Nevertheless, a related result can be achieved.
Theorem 23. Let (M, X ) |= GBC be countable. Then there is Y X a GBC-realization which is minimal above X : if Z X is a GBC-realization, then Y ⊆ Z.
This theorem shows that the poset consisting of countable GBC-realizations of a fixed countable M |= ZFC is not dense in a strong sense. For any X in this poset there is Y ⊇ X with no elements of the poset in-between them. On the other hand, proposition 22 gives Z ⊇ X so that the interval (X , Z) of intermediate GBC-realizations contains a dense linear order.
Before proving this theorem, it will be necessary to set up some machinery. Work with a fixed countable M = (M, X ) |= GBC. Let B denote the full Ord-length binary tree. For a perfect tree P ⊆ B, say that Q ⊆ P is n-deciding for P if for every Σ n formula ϕ in the forcing language for M , there is an ordinal α so that if p ∈ Q has length greater than α then p decides ϕ. It is not hard to see that if P ∈ X then we can find Q ∈ X which is n-deciding for P. Moreover, we can find such Q which does not split below a fixed α ∈ Ord.
Definition 24. A function G : Ord → 2 is called a perfect generic if there is a sequence B = P 0 ⊇ P 1 ⊇ · · · ⊇ P n ⊇ · · · of perfect trees from X so that G = ( n P n ) and P n+1 is n-deciding for P n for all n.
A subtle point is that a perfect generic need not be fully generic over any of the P n . So the model generated by a perfect generic G, namely M[G] = (M, {X ⊆ M : X ∈ Def(M, G, A) for some A ∈ X }), need not be a class forcing extension of M. Nevertheless, M[G] will still satisfy GBC. Extensionality, Global Choice, and First-Order Comprehension are immediate. To see M[G] satisfies Replacement, take a class function F . Then F is definable by a Σ k -formula for some k with parametres G and A ∈ X . But then the behavior of F is forced by conditions in P k+1 ⊇ G.
Because perfect generics need not be fully generic, we need to refine some standard facts about class forcing. I summarize them here. First, the forcing relation (for pretame forcings, such as the posets we will use) for formulae of bounded complexity is definable. That is, the relation p P ϕ, confined to ϕ which are Σ k is Σ j -definable from P for some j > k. (It does not matter for our purposes what this j is, just that it is finite.) Second, we need to refine the usual "forcing equals truth" lemma: for ϕ which are Σ k there is j > k so that for any G ⊆ P which is Σ j -generic over M then M[G] |= ϕ if and only if there is p ∈ G so that p P ϕ. This can be proved via a standard inductive argument, attending to the complexity of the definitions of the dense sets involved. In short, the standard facts for forcing apply for partial generics, except that we must be careful to confine ourselves to things which are sufficiently simple.
The following lemmata will be used to prove the theorem. They are set theoretic analogues of results from section 6.5 of [KS06] .
Lemma 25. Let ϕ(x) be a formula in the forcing language and P ∈ X be a perfect subtree of B.
There is Q ⊆ P in X so that one of the two cases holds:
(1) There is an ordinal α so that for all ordinals ξ we have that all p ∈ Q of length greater than α decide ϕ(ξ) (in P) the same. (2) For every ordinal α there is β > α so that if p, q ∈ Q both have length β and p ↾ α = q ↾ α then there is an ordinal ξ so that p and q decide ϕ(ξ) differently (in P).
Proof. Fix k so that ϕ is a Σ k formula. Take P ′ ⊆ P a k-deciding subtree for P. We may assume that there is a function f : B → P ′ which embeds the full binary tree onto the splitting nodes of P ′ and that f (s) decides ϕ(len s). There are two cases. The first is that there is some s ∈ B so that for every t, t ′ > B s if len t = len t ′ then f (t) and f (t ′ ) decide ϕ(ξ) the same for all ordinals ξ. In this case, set Q = P ′ ↾ f (s) and get the first conclusion in the lemma. The second case is that this does not happen for any s ∈ B. In this case, we can inductively define a g : B → P ′ as follows:
• Set g(s 0) = p 0 and g(s 1) = p 1 , where p 0 , p 1 are least (according to a fixed global wellorder) so that len p 0 = len p 1 and there is an ordinal ξ so that p 0 and p 1 decide ϕ(ξ) differently. Such p 0 and p 1 always exist, as otherwise we would be in the previous case.
• At limit stages take unions. Set Q = {p ∈ P ′ : ∃s ∈ B p ≤ P ′ g(s)}. This yields the second conclusion in the lemma.
Observe that we used global choice in an essential manner here. There are possibly many choices for p 0 and p 1 in the successor stage of the construction of g. In order to guarantee that g ∈ X and hence that Q ∈ X , we need to uniquely specify a choice.
This puts us in a position to prove a minimality lemma for perfect generics.
Lemma 26. Let (M, X ) |= GBC be countable. Then there is a perfect generic G ∈ X so that for any class A of ordinals definable from G (and possibly parameters from X ), either G is definable from A and parameters from X or else A ∈ X .
Proof. Fix a cofinal sequence α n of ordinals and an enumeration ϕ n (x) of formulae in the forcing language. We construct a descending sequence of perfect trees
so that P n is an n-deciding subtree of Q n which does not split below α n and Q n+1 ⊆ P n is as in the previous lemma for ϕ n . Our perfect generic is G = ( n P n ).
Consider a class of ordinals A defined from G and parameters in X , where G x ∈ A ⇔ ϕ n (x). Consider Q n+1 ⊆ P n . If the first case from the previous lemma holds, then A ∈ X because ξ ∈ A if and only if for every p ∈ Q n+1 the length of p being sufficiently long implies that p Pn ϕ n (ξ). If the second case of the previous lemma holds, then we can define G from A. In this case, p ∈ n P n if and only if for every ordinal α there is q > Qn+1 p of length greater than α so that q Pn ϕ n (ξ) ⇔ ξ ∈ A for all ordinals ξ. From a definition of n P n can easily be produced a definition for G.
Proof of theorem 23. We start with countable (M, X ) |= GBC. Let G be the perfect generic as in the minimality lemma. Set Y to be the classes definable from G and parameters in X . Then, Y is a GBC-realization for M . Suppose that Z is a GBC-realization so that X ⊆ Z ⊆ Y. Consider arbitrary A ∈ Z. We may assume that A is a class of ordinals by mapping A, via a fixed bijection V → Ord from X , into the ordinals. By the minimality lemma, either G is definable from A or else A ∈ X . Therefore, if Z = X then G is definable from an element of Z (with parameters from X ) and hence Y = Z.
As remarked earlier, Global Choice was used essentially in the proof of lemma 25. Proving this lemma without Global Choice would yield a construction for minimal but not least GBC-realizations. Namely, start with a countable M |= ZFC with no definable global well-order. Let X = Def(M ). Then (M, X ) is a model of GBC minus Global Choice. Applying the theorem to (M, X ) would yield a GBC-realization Y for M which is minimal above X . But since any GBC-realization must contain X , this would give that Y is a minimal GBC-realization for M .
Thus, the problem of constructing a minimal but not least GBC-realization can be reduced down to the problem of proving the minimality lemma for perfect generics without using choice. A similar question can be asked for ordinary Sacks forcing.
Question 27. Is choice needed to prove the minimality lemma for Sacks forcing? That is, is it consistent that there are M |= ZF + ¬AC, s ⊆ ω M Sacks-generic over M , and
ETR and its fragments
The main result of this section is that there is a smallest β-model of ETR. First, a warm-up.
Theorem 28. If M |= ZFC + ∃x V = HOD({x}) is β-ETR-realizable, then M has a least β-ETRrealization.
Proof. Suppose (M, Y) |= ETR is a β-model. Externally to (M, Y) we will construct a ETRrealization X ⊆ Y for M and then see that the construction for X gives the same ETR-realization no matter which Y we started with.
Let X 0 = Def(M ). Because M has a definable global well-order, (M, X 0 ) |= GBC. Now, given X n , define X n+1 to consist of all classes of M definable from elements of {Tr Γ (A) : A, Γ ∈ X n and Γ is a class well-order}. Recall that Tr Γ (A) denotes the Γ-iterated truth predicate relative to the class A, where Γ is a class well-order. A few remarks are in order to clarify why this definition is well-formed. First, note that X 0 ⊆ Y and thus (M, X 0 ) is a β-model. Second, if X n ⊆ Y then X n+1 ⊆ Y. This is because Y must have iterated truth predicates relative to any of its classes and because Y and X n agree on what class relations are well-founded, both being β-models. Inductively, this yields that each X n ⊆ Y is a β-model. Because each of these is a β-model, they agree with V on whether Γ is a well-order. Finally, because M is transitive it has unique iterated truth predicates relative to a given parameter.
Set X = n X n . Easily, X ⊆ Y. Because X is an increasing union of GBC-realizations, X itself is a GBC-realization for M . To see that (M, X ) |= ETR, note that if A, Γ ∈ X then A, Γ ∈ X n for some n and thus Tr Γ (A) ∈ X n+1 ⊆ X .
It remains only to see that we get the same X regardless of our choice of Y. But this is immediate, since Y was not actually used to define the X n . We only used that X n ⊆ Y to conclude that (M, X n ) is a β-model, and this is true for any Y a β-ETR-realization for M .
Theorem 29 (Main Theorem 2). There is a least β-model of ETR, if there is any β-model of ETR.
Proof. First, let us see that if M is β-ETR-realizable then so is L M . This is of independent interest, so I will separate it out as its own lemma.
Before proving this, let us see why merely restricting the classes to those which are subclasses of L will not work. Suppose (M, Y) |= ETR is transitive with 0
Proof of lemma 29.1. Let (M, Y) |= ETR be a β-model and let κ = Ord M . We want to find
Then, by observation 18, (L κ , X ) will be a β-model. This can be done by an argument analogous to the proof of theorem 28.
First, observe that Y contains iterated truth predicates for inner models. If W ⊆ M is an inner model in Y then Tr W Γ (A), the Γ-iterated truth predicate for W relative to the parameter A, is also in Y. This is because Tr W Γ (A) can be constructed via a transfinite recursion of rank ω · Γ.
Finally, set X = n X n . Similar to before, we get that (L κ , X ) |= ETR: given Γ, A ∈ X there is n so that Γ, A ∈ X n so Tr Γ (A) ∈ X n+1 ⊆ X .
There is, however, one new issue which must be addressed. In the proof of theorem 28 it was immediate that each X n was a GBC-realization. The potential sticking point is Replacement. But because X n ⊆ Y had the same first-order part, Replacement for Y gave Replacement for X n . This is not in general true if the first-order part for X n is smaller than the first-order part for Y.
Here, however, we do get that (L κ , X n+1 ) satisfies Replacement. To see this, fix a ∈ L M and a class function F ∈ X n+1 . Because Γ really is well-founded, externally to M we can find an ordinal γ so that otp(Γ) = γ. We can inductively show that X n+1 = P(L κ ) ∩ L ξ where ξ is the supremum of the order-types of well-orders in X n . Note that L ξ |= κ is regular, as otherwise Y would contain a cofinal function α → Ord M for some α ∈ Ord M , which is impossible. Therefore,
As a consequence, the least β-model of ETR must have first-order part of the form L α for some α.
Let L α be so that α is the least ordinal with L α being β-ETR-realizable. By theorem 28, let
M > α then L α ∈ M and thus M can construct X by ordinary transfinite recursion on sets.
Essentially the same argument gives least β-models for ETR Γ .
The purpose of requiring Γ ≥ ω ω is that this ensures ETR Γ is equivalent to the existence of Γ-iterated truth predicates relative to any class. See corollary 6. The same applies to later theorems, but I will suppress making this comment every time.
Proof of lemma 30. This is done almost the same as the proof for theorem 28. Namely, set X 0 = Def(M, Γ) and set X n+1 to consist of all clases of M definable from Tr Γ (A) for A ∈ X n . Finally, set X = n X n . These are well-defined because Γ is a well-order. Then, similar to before, (M, X ) is easily seen to be contained in any β-model (M, Y) |= ETR Γ and is itself a β-model of ETR Γ .
Theorem 31. Let Γ be a name for a class well-order ≥ ω ω . That is, Γ is defined by some formula so that any model of GBC thinks the class defined by that formula is well-ordered. (For instance, Γ might be Ord.) If there is a β-model of ETR Γ then there is a least β-model of ETR Γ .
Proof. This follows from lemma 30 plus the fact that if M is β-ETR Γ -realizable then so is L M . This fact can be proved similar to the argument for lemma 29.1, except that we only need iterated truth predicates of length Γ, rather than of arbitrary length. That is, start with (M,
We also get least transitive models for ETR Ord and sufficiently weak fragments of ETR.
Proof. For the proof of lemma 30 the only place it was used that M is β-ETR Γ -realizable was to get that Γ really is well-founded (i.e. in V ). But the Ord of a transitive model of GBC is well-founded, even if it fails to be a β-model. So the exact same argument goes through. That is, the least ETR Ord -realization for M is X = n X n where X 0 = Def(M ) and X n+1 = {Def(M, Tr Ord (A)) : A ∈ X n }.
Theorem 33. If there is a transitive model of ETR Ord then there is a least transitive model of ETR Ord .
Proof. Combine lemma 32 plus the fact that M being ETR Ord -realizable implies L M is ETR Ordrealizable. Again, this is proved much the same as lemma 29.
Ord (A) for some A ∈ X n . The attentive reader will notice that the above argument applies to more than just Ord. Specifically, the only fact about Ord that was used was that if M is transitive then Ord M is well-founded. The same argument goes through if Ord is replaced by a name for an ordinal or a class well-order which is well-founded in any transitive model. So the same argument goes through more generally, for example if Ord is replaced by ω 1 or Ord
Ord or Ord Left open by this analysis is how far we can go. It follows from the proof of theorem 41 that there are names Γ for class well-orders so that there are transitive (M, X ) with Γ (M,X ) ill-founded (i.e. in V ). In particular, this holds if Γ is the least class well-order so that L Γ is admissible. But that definition of Γ requires quantifying over classes. What if we only allow definitions that are first-order?
Question 34. If Γ is a name for a class well-order defined by a first-order formula, must it be the case that Γ M is well-founded for any transitive M |= ZFC?
To finish this section, let us see that ETR is not equivalent to ETR Γ for any Γ. Moreover, we can separate fragments of ETR. This establishes that theorem 31 is not redundant with theorem 29 and that theorem 33 does not immediately imply that there is a least transitive model of ETR.
First, if Γ is sufficiently smaller than ∆ then a model of ETR Γ need not be a model of ETR ∆ .
Theorem 35. Let (M, X ) |= GBC and let Γ ∈ X be a well-order
Then, Y is coded in X via the code C = {((g, ϕ, a), x) : (g, ϕ, a x) ∈ Tr Γ·ω (G)}. Also, Y is the increasing union of the Def(M, Tr Ξ (G)) for Ξ initial segments of Γ · ω, each of which is a GBCrealization for M . Thus, (M, Y) |= GBC. Next, (M, Y) satisfies Elementary Transfinite Recursion for recursions of rank ≤ Γ because given X ∈ Y it must be that X ∈ Def(M, Tr Ξ (G)) for some Ξ an initial segment of Γ · ω and thus
This result is optimal for transitive models because ETR Γ is equivalent to ETR Γ·n for any standard n ∈ ω.
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As an immediate corollary we get that fragments of ETR can be separated by consistency strength.
Corollary 36. Let Γ be a name for a well-order ≥ ω ω . Then ETR proves Con(ETR Γ ). Moreover if Γ and ∆ are names for well-orders so that GBC proves Γ · ω ≤ ∆ then ETR ∆ proves Con(ETR Γ ).
Proof. Let (M, X ) |= ETR ∆ . By the previous theorem there is Y ⊆ X coded in X so that (M, Y) |= ETR Γ . But (M, X ) has access to the full second-order truth predicate for coded models, via an elementary recursion of length ω. So (M, X ) |= Con(ETR Γ ).
In theorem 35 we produced a model (M, Y) of ETR Γ which was not a model of ETR Γ·ω . But this was due to a deficiency the second-order part. We produced Y by taking a restricted collection of classes from X so as to not have long enough iterated truth predicates to get a model of ETR Γ·ω . Can we separate fragments of ETR with the first-order part of a model? That is, is there M |= ZFC so that M is ETR Γ -realizable but not ETR Γ·ω -realizable?
Of course, if we put no restriction on M then this follows immediately from the fact that ETR Γ·ω proves the consistency of ETR Γ . If M is the first-order part of a model of ETR Γ + ¬ Con(ETR Γ ) then M will not be ETR Γ·ω -realizable. Such M will necessarily be ω-nonstandard. Can we make the same separation, but with an M which is ω-standard, or even transitive?
The answer is yes, looking below ETR Ord .
Theorem 37. Suppose γ is a name for an ordinal ≥ ω ω . (In particular, γ is a set, not a proper class.) If there is a transitive model of ETR γ·ω then there is transitive M which is ETR γ -realizable but not ETR γ·ω -realizable.
Proof. Take (N, Y) |= ETR γ·ω which has a first-order definable global well-order. Consider the iterated truth predicates T = {Tr ξ : ξ = γ · n} and let (M, S) = Sk (N, T ) (γ) be the Skolem hull of γ in the structure (M, T ). By elementarity, S = {(Tr ξ ) M : ξ = γ · n}. Moreover, γ · n ∈ N for all n because (N, T ) satisfies that the length of each truth predicate in T is a set.
Let X = Def(M, S). Then, (M, X ) |= ETR γ ; given A ∈ X there is n so that A is definable from Tr γ·n (Ḡ). But then Tr γ (A) is definable from Tr γ·(n+1) .
However, M is not ETR γ·ω -realizable. This is because the (γ · ω + 1)-iterated truth predicate for M reveals that M is a Skolem hull and hence countable. But no model of ZFC thinks that it is countable. So no GBC-realization for M can contain Tr M γ·ω+1 , which ETR γ·ω proves exists. Left open by this section is whether ETR has a least transitive model. The proof that there is a least β-model of ETR came down to two facts: first, that if a model of ZFC with a definable global well-order is β-ETR-realizable then it has a least β-ETR-realization; second, that if M is β-ETR-realizable then so is L M . One strategy to try to prove the existence of a least transitive model of ETR would be to prove analogues of these two facts. The latter-i.e. that if M is ETR-realizable then so is L M -can be proven by an argument similar to the proof of lemma 29.1, but done entirely interally to (M, X ).
I do not see how to settle the analogue of the first fact. Working towards a positive answer, the proof of theorem 29 does not generalize to show that transitive ETR-realizable models with definable global well-orders have least ETR-realizations. Working towards a negative naswer, the argument in the next section that no countable model of ZFC has a least KM-realization does not generalize down to ETR. The trouble is that ETR is too weak for the same proof to go through. Namely, ETR does not prove that there is an admissible "meta-ordinal". 
is the least β-model of KM. First, observe that it is itself a β-model since L α is correct about well-foundedness. Let λ be the largest cardinal in W . There are two cases. The first is if λ > κ. Then, because W thinks λ is inaccessible, W thinks P(L κ ) exists. Therefore,
The same is not true if we look at transitive models, rather than confining ourselves to β-models.
Theorem 41 (Main Theorem 1). There is no least transitive model of KM. Moreover, for any real r there is no least transitive model of KM which contains r.
Note that it suffices to prove the moreover, as r = ∅ gives the other result.
Proof of theorem 41. Suppose otherwise towards a contradiction that (M, X ) is the least transitive model of KM which contains r. By a Löwenheim-Skolem argument it must be that M and X are countable. Moreover, by theorem 12, (M, X ) must be a model of KM + . Let W |= ZFC − I be the unrolling of (M, X ). By taking an isomorphic copy, if necessary, of (M, X ), assume without loss that M ⊆ W and X = {X ∈ W : W |= X ⊆ M }. Let κ be the largest cardinal in W . In particular,
First, we want to find A ∈ W so that W believes A is an admissible set with M as an element. This is done via the standard argument for the Montague reflection principle, except that we cannot use the V ξ hierarchy because the collection of sets of rank ξ ≥ κ will not be a set in W . Instead fix a bijection G : M → κ and we will work with the L ξ (M, G) hierarchy. Proof. Define a sequence ξ n : n ∈ ω as follows. Start with arbitrary ξ 0 so that m ∈ L ξ0 (m). Given ξ n let ξ n+1 be the least ordinal α so that L α (m) has witnesses for existential subformulae of ϕ with parameters from L ξn (m), if such witnesses exist in W . Such α exists by an instance of Collection.
Let ϕ be a formula so that A |= ϕ if and only if A |= KP. This can be expressed as a single formula via the usual construction of bounded truth predicates. By the lemma find A ∋ M, G, where G is the bijection κ → M fixed above, in W so that A |= KP. Such exists because L(M, G) |= ZFC − and thus L(M, G) |= KP.
We are now in a position to apply theorem 15, the generalization of Friedman's theorem. Consider the theory which consists of the following assertions.
• All axioms of ZFC − I ; • The assertion that M is a rank-initial segment of the universe; and • The assertion that κ = Ord M is the largest cardinal and is inaccessible.
Note that W is a model of this theory which contains A. Let C = Cov A be the admissible cover of A (see section 3 for definitions). Because M is an element of A, this theory can be axiomatized by a single L C -formula and is a fortiori Σ 1 -definable in C. Applying theorem 15 to A and this theory we get N |= ZFC − I such that • N is an end extension of A;
• Ord
A is a proper initial segment of Ord N ;
• A is not topped in N -there is no α ∈ Ord N so that {β ∈ Ord N : N |= β < α} = Ord A ; and It might be, however, that X is wrong about well-foundedness. 10 One could imagine that X came from applying Friedman's theorem as above to a β-model. If this were done using the least admissible set with M as an element then every meta-ordinal which X thinks is the height of an admissible class with M as an element would be ill-founded. The argument from the previous paragraph does not work in this case. Then, Y will have meta-ordinals it thinks are non-isomorphic but which are seen from the ambient universe to be isomorphic to Ord
A . This is a consequence of a theorem, due to H. Friedman [Fri73] , that if M is a countable ill-founded ω-model of KP that Ord M ∼ = α + α · Q, where α = Ord wfp(M) . Nevertheless, even if A is ill-founded, Y will not contain an element representing Ord A in the unrolled model N . This will contradict the assumed leastness of X , as desired.
Let us see why this is. Pick ∆ ∈ X so that W |= ∆ ∼ = Ord A . That is, ∆ represents Ord A in the unrolling. By the minimality of X we have ∆ ∈ Y. Because being a well-order is an elementary property, (M, Y) |= ∆ is a well-order. Let δ ∈ N be an ordinal so that N |= δ ∼ = ∆.
I claim for any γ ∈ Ord N that N |= γ < δ if and only if γ ∈ A. The backward direction is clear, since γ ∈ A implies there is π ∈ X so that π is a map witnessing that Γ ∼ = γ is an initial segment of ∆ and the leastness of X implies π ∈ Y. For the forward direction, suppose N |= γ < δ. Then there is g ∈ dom ∆ so that
In X we have ∆ ↾ g must represent an ordinal < δ and thus there is Γ ∈ A ∩ X so that Γ represents γ. But then γ ∈ A.
So Ord A is topped in N by δ, contradicting the construction of N . Thus our original assumption that there is a least transitive model of KM must be false.
Corollary 42. No countable model of set theory has a least KM-realization.
10 Indeed, if M is the least transitive KM-realizable model then it must be that X is wrong about well-foundedness. Proof. This follows from the proof of the previous theorem. Nowhere in the proof did we use the fact that M was transitive.
Suppose that X were the least KM-realization for countable M |= ZFC. As before, it must be that X is a countable KM + -realization for M . The same argument gives a KM + -realization Y for M so that X ⊆ Y, contradicting the leastness of X .
We can also extract from the proof of theorem 41 the following well-known result.
Corollary 43. There are transitive models of KM which are not β-models.
(Indeed, there are transitive KM-realizable models which have no β-KM-realization; Marek and Mostowski [MM75] proved that the least height of a transitive KM-realizable model is less than the least height of a β-KM-realizable model.)
As in the GBC case, this result leaves open the question of minimal but non-least KM-realizations. Also open is whether there is a transitive model of KM which is minimal-but necessarily not leastamong the transitive models of KM.
Question 44.
• Which (countable) models of ZFC have minimal KM-realizations?
• Is there a minimal transitive model of KM? That is, does there exist transitive (M, X ) |= KM so that if (N, Y) |= KM is contained inside (M, X ) then N = M and Y = X ?
The first question has an easy positive answer for a certain natural case.
Corollary 45. If M has a least β-KM-realization then it has a minimal (but non-least) KMrealization Proof. Let X be the least β-KM-realization for M . By observation 18, any Y ⊆ X must also be a β-realization. So if Y ⊆ X is a KM-realization then Y = X . So X is a minimal KM-realization for M .
The general case remains open.
6.1. Further and prior results. As a last matter I wish to briefly explicate how main theorem 1 can be generalized and then to contrast the result with previous theorems in the literature. First, generalizing the main theorem: The key fact used in the proof was that KM + is biinterpretable with a first-order theory which proves that Hyp(X), the smallest admissible set with X as an element, exists for every set X. The Marek-Mostowski argument can be generalized to get that models of ETR can be unrolled into first-order models. Moreover, Π 1 1 -CA suffices to get that the unrolled model has that Hyp(X) exists for all sets X. As a consequence one can obtain the following, a full proof of which will appear in my forthcoming dissertation. Second, H. Friedman [Fri73] showed that there is not a least ω-model of Z 2 , full second-order arithmetic. Nowhere in the proof of theorem 41 was it used that the KM model satisfies the axiom of Infinity. Because the Marek-Mostowski bi-interpretability result does not need the axiom of Infinity, this gives that there is no least transitive model of KM ¬∞ . 11 Using that KM ¬∞ and Z 2 are bi-interpretable this gives a new proof that there is no smallest ω-model of Z 2 .
Finally, I wish to briefly contrast my results with two previous results in the literature about least models of KM. There are subtleties which are obscured by the language used and I wish to clarify how this article fits into the broader context.
The first is a result due to Marek and Mostowski [MM75] . In their language, they proved that there are minimal models of KM. Let KM ¬GC denote KM with Global Choice thrown out. Marek and Mostowski proved, in my language, that every β-KM ¬GC -realizable model has a least β-KM ¬GC -realization. As an immediate corollary, if M has a definable global well-order and is β-KM-realizable then it has a least β-KM-realization. See also my corollary 45.
The second result is due to Antos and S. Friedman [AF] . In their language, they proved that every β-model of KM + can be extended to a minimal β-model of KM + . For them, a minimal β-model of KM + is a β-model M of KM + so that there is some real S so that any β-model of KM + which contains S must contain M . My theorem 41 shows that their result cannot possibly be generalized from β-models to transitive models. I see this as justifying Antos and Friedman's restriction to looking only at β-models. They justify this restriction (in their footnote 3) by analogy to ZFC, saying that it only makes sense to talk about minimal models for well-founded models. I view this analogy as unfounded; there is a least transitive model of GBC-and even of ETR Ord , which is far stronger than GBC-least among even the models which are wrong about well-foundedness. Nevertheless, their restriction is necessary to get the sort of result they are looking at.
